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FINAL BOARDING CALL-THE WARSAW
CONVENTION'S EXCLUSIVITY AND
PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW CLAIMS IN
INTERNATIONAL AIR TRAVEL: EL AL
ISRAEL AIRLINES, LTD. v. TSENG
HOWARD SOKOL*
"How many smart people from how many countries came up
with this?"'
-SUPREME COURT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA
INTRODUCTION
A. The Warsaw Convention
The Convention for the Unification of Certain2 Rules
Relating to International Transportation by Air 3 (Warsaw
. J.D. Candidate, June 2000, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., M.B.A.,
Binghamton University (The State University of New York).
1 Tony Mauro, High Court Weighs Case Against Airline Security: International
Law Limiting Damages Complicates Issue, USA TODAY, Nov. 11, 1998, at 3A
(quoting Justice Scalia who expressed his exasperation at the antiquated and
confusing language that is the hallmark of the seventy-year-old Warsaw
Convention); Gaylord Shaw, Does Warsaw Pact Apply? High Court to Decide if
Woman Can Sue Airline on Tight Security, NEWSDAY, Nov. 11, 1998, at A19 (same).
2 The use of the word "Certain" and more specifically, the phrase "Unification of
Certain Rules" is important in treaty interpretation. The British House of Lords
noted the use of this phrase can denote two alternative meanings: (1) that the
Convention serves to unify all rules to which it may apply and the Convention
charges itself with laying out its only possible exceptions; or (2) that the goal of
uniformity is only for the specific situations outlined in the Convention itself and
not extending to those outside its purview. See Robert Coleman, Commentary, I
Saw Her Duck: Does Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention "Cover" Injuries or
Accidents?, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 191, 228-29 (1998) (citing the House of Lords'
discussion on the preemptive effect of the Warsaw Convention in Sidhu v. British
Airways, plc., 1 All E.R. 193, 204-05 (H.L. 1997)).
3 The United States deposited its instrument of adherence on July 31, 1934,
thus signifying its intention to be bound by the articles of the Warsaw Convention.
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Convention) was borne out of the Second International
Conference on Private Aeronautical Law in 1929.4 The United
States, although not a party to the Warsaw Convention's
negotiation and drafting process, ratified the treaty in 1934.5
Through a set of uniform rules and provisions, the Warsaw
Convention, a multilateral treaty, serves to define and govern
the relationship and interdependence between carriers and
passengers who are involved in international air travel.6 The
impetus behind the Warsaw Convention was to aid international
air carriers during the expansive, yet turbulent, pre-World War
II period.7 It filled a void of uncertainty and calmed anxiety by
"foster[ing] the growth of the fledgling commercial aviation
industry"8 thereby providing for consistent rules and regulations.
The Warsaw Convention's delegates and drafters had dual
objectives: (1) to create a template of regulation and law that
See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 12737,
at *19 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting the "procedure set forth in Article 37 of the treaty"
requires the instrument of adherence to be deposited in the archives of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Poland); In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on Dec. 21,
1998, 928 F.2d 1267, 1271 (2d Cir. 1991). On October 29, 1934, the United States
entered the Warsaw Convention into force and codified the text of the Convention
into the United States Code. See 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (1994); Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct.
12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
4 See Coleman, supra note 2, at 195.
5 See id.; see also In re Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1271 ("Although the United
States had not participated in the work of CITEJA [the 1925 Paris airline industry
conference-Commitd International Technique d'Experts Juridique Airiens] and
only sent an observer to Warsaw, it moved quickly thereafter, depositing its
instrument of adherence on July 31, 1934.").
6 See Alexander N. Sack, International Unification of Private Law Rules on Air
Transportation and the Warsaw Convention, 4 AIR L. REV. 345, 348 (1933) ("The
Warsaw Convention provides for the adoption by the States, parties to it, of some
unified private law rules on air transportation."); Gregory C. Sisk, Recovery for
Emotional Distress Under the Warsaw Convention: The Elusive Search for the
French Legal Meaning of Lsion Corporelle, 25 TEX. INT'L L.J. 127, 129 (1990)
(noting that "the participants wished to establish uniform rules governing the rights
and liabilities of parties to contracts of international air carriage").
7 See In re Korean Air, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 12737, at *20 (quoting Secretary
of State Cordell Hull: "[The Warsaw Convention] will prove to be an aid in the
development of international air transportation...."); see also Sisk, supra note 6, at
129 ("[A] number of nations [hoped] to achieve an international agreement in order
to both regulate and encourage the fledgling, pre-World War II aviation industry.").
The conferences sought to accomplish these objectives by establishing uniform
guidelines that would impose limitations on the airlines' potential liability to
travelers together with limitations on the defenses available to the airlines. See id.
8 Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 546 (1991).
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would transcend the differences in language, culture, and
regional law of the participating nations,9 and (2) to strike a
delicate balance between insuring passengers' interests in
recovering damages and protecting international airline carriers
by limiting their potential liability.10
Undoubtedly, treaties, as expressly laid out in the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution," are the
preeminent law of the land.12 Therefore, in the event of conflict
between a treaty's provisions and a particular state law, the
treaty will preempt state law.13
B. Procedural History
The Supreme Court of the United States recently confronted
the challenge of deciphering the articles of the Warsaw
Convention.14 In El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng,15 the Court
sought to determine whether the Warsaw Convention provided
9 See Coleman, supra note 2, at 195; see also Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I.
Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497,
497-99 (1967) (detailing the history of the United States' initial adoption of the
Warsaw Convention, while exploring the 1965 denunciation by the United States of
the treaty's limits on liability).
10 See Coleman, supra note 2, at 195; Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 9,
at 499.
11 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause, which details the
superiority of federal law over state law, provides that:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id. While the framers of the Constitution designated the U.S. Constitution to be the
"supreme Law of the Land," the text continues that "all Treaties made.., under the
Authority of the United States" are similarly designated. Id.
12 Specifically, as it relates to this Comment, the Warsaw Convention is a
treaty and thus deserves the same supreme status as the U.S. Constitution as
delineated in Article VI, Clause 2 of the Constitution. See Sisk, supra note 6, at 130
("As a treaty, the [Warsaw] Convention constitutes part of the supreme law of the
United States and must be applied notwithstanding state law.").
13 See Coleman, supra note 2, at 195 ("Like other treaties ratified by the
Senate, the Warsaw Convention is the supreme law of the land; therefore, according
to the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the Warsaw Convention can
preempt state laws.").
14 See Mauro, supra note 1, at 3A ("Justices struggled to determine how
[Tseng's] lawsuit.., should be handled."). The alternatives were whether to allow
the suit to proceed in federal court or disallow the suit because of the Warsaw
Convention. See id.
IS 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
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the exclusive remedy for passengers injured during the course of
international air transportation, thereby precluding any causes
of action under state law for passengers who fall outside the
treaty's purview. 16 The Court granted certiorari to decide this
recurring issue after twice refusing to address the preemption
issue on similar facts. 17
The Second Circuit United States Court of Appeals tackled
two issues in Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd.18 The first
concerned the meaning of the word "accident" in Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention.19 The second, the more wily of the two
issues, was whether an injured plaintiff is denied a state law
remedy when the Warsaw Convention is not applicable to his or
her specific situation. 20
Tsui Yuan Tseng initially filed suit in New York State
Supreme Court for New York County.21 Because the State of
Israel, a foreign state, owned El Al Israel Airlines, the airline
16 On May 18, 1998, the Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of
certiorari, but limited the grant to the first question of the petition. See Tseng v. El
Al Airlines, Ltd., 122 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 523 U.S. 1117 (May 18,
1998) (No. 97-475), rev'd, 525 U.S. 155 (1999). The first "Question Presented"
queried: "Whether the Warsaw Convention, a treaty of the United States,
exclusively governs and precludes any recovery for a passenger's injuries sustained
in the course of 'international transportation' if the injuries were not caused by an
'accident' within the meaning of Article 17 of the Convention?" Brief for Petitioner,
El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999) (No. 97-475), available in
1998 WL 401526, at *i.
17 See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991) (disallowing recovery
for passengers alleging mental anguish after an airplane narrowly avoided a crash,
under the theory that Article 17 does not permit recovery for purely mental
injuries); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985) (denying recovery for a
passenger's loss of hearing in one ear allegedly caused by the negligent operation of
a pressurization system, where the evidence indicated the pressurization system
was operating normally and, therefore, no "accident" had occurred within the
meaning of Article 17). In these cases, the Supreme Court did not have a clear
record on which to decide a preemption issue. The Court, instead, decided both cases
on alternative grounds. In Floyd, the Supreme Court reasoned that "[t]he Court of
Appeals did not address [the preemption question], and we did not grant certiorari
to consider it. We therefore decline to reach it here." Floyd, 499 U.S. at 553. In Saks,
the Supreme Court "[e]xpress[ed] no view on the merits [of a possible state law
cause of action] ... [and] note[d] that it [was] unclear from the record whether the
issue [of preemption] was raised in the Court of Appeals." Saks, 470 U.S. at 408; see
also Coleman, supra note 2, at 200.
Is 122 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997), rev'd, 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
19 See id. at 100.
20 See id.
21 See id. at 101.
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removed the case to federal district court.22 Tseng's complaint,
which alleged personal injury under New York tort law, charged
El Al with "assault, false imprisonment, physical and mental
abuse and humiliation, and the loss of and damage to her
property."23 The events leading to the cause of action took place
on May 22, 1993 during a pre-flight security check at El Al's
terminal at John F. Kennedy International Airport in Queens,
New York 24
In March 1996, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York effectively dismissed Tseng's
personal injury claim.2 5 The court ruled that El Al's security
search of Tseng constituted an "accident" within the meaning of
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention,26 and it did not amount to
willful misconduct even though the airline's misgivings about
Tseng were proven to be misguided and unsubstantiated. 27
Furthermore, the court held that, absent a showing that Tseng
sustained physical injury or bodily harm, Tseng was not entitled
to recover damages from El Al for compensation for her personal
injuries and emotional distress.28 Consequently, Tseng was only
entitled to $1,034.90, the maximum allowable recovery, for the
loss and damage to her property, as prescribed by Article 22 of
the Warsaw Convention. 29
Subsequently, on a cross appeal, 30 the Second Circuit
22 See id. The suit qualified for removal based on the diversity of citizenship of
the parties under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d). The State of Israel is a
foreign state within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a), which states, inter alia,
that a "foreign state'.., includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state." Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)). El Al
removed the case from New York State Supreme Court to the Federal District Court
in the Southern District of New York. See id.
23 Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 919 F. Supp. 155, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1996),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 122 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997), rev'd, 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
24 See id. at 157.
25 See id. at 160.
2G See id. at 158.
27 See id.
28 See id. (concluding that the Court's holding in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd
squarely disallowed any recovery for psychic or psychosomatic injury
unaccompanied by bodily injury").
29 See id. at 160 (discussing the calculation of Tseng's damages in light of the
Convention's limitations on the airline's liability).
30 See Tseng v. El Al Airlines, Ltd., 122 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997), rev'd, 525 U.S.
155 (1999). In the spirit of fair and accurate reporting, it is necessary to mention
that the appeal to the Second Circuit was a cross appeal. Tseng appealed the
dismissal of her claims for personal injury for failure to establish a recognizable
20001 231
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affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding the case for
further findings.31 The court found that the airline's security
search of Tseng did not constitute an "accident" within the
meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.3 2 Moreover,
the court held that Tseng's claim for property loss and damage
was covered by Articles 18 and 22 of the Warsaw Convention,
but her claim for personal injury was not covered under the
provisions and requirements set out in Article 17.33 Finally, the
court found that Tseng was rightfully entitled to bring her
personal injury claim under state law.34 The Second Circuit held
that a state law claim is not precluded when the event giving
rise to a potential cause of action is outside the scope of the
Warsaw Convention.35
Finally, in January 1999, the Supreme Court of the United
States ruled on the availability of state law remedies when a
plaintiffs claim lies outside the scope of the Warsaw
injury under Article 17 and El Al appealed the district court's award to Tseng ofjust
over $1000 for property loss and damage. In short, El Al believed that Tseng acted
outside of the allowable time frame established in the Warsaw Convention in order
to contact an airline and report loss or damage to one's personal property. The trial
court concluded that extenuating circumstances, as well as El Al's offer to extend
the notification period beyond the time frame allowed in the Warsaw Convention, in
effect made El Al liable to Tseng for her lost and damaged property. The Second
Circuit agreed without much discussion.
31 See id. at 108.
32 See id. at 104; see also id. at 102 (stating that while the term "accident" is not
defined in the Warsaw Convention, the Supreme Court defined the term as "'an
unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger'")
(quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985)).
33 See id. at 104.
34 See id. at 108 (holding that "where the Convention is inapplicable, a plaintiff
may seek recourse under state law").
35 See id. at 105. The Second Circuit found ample support for this proposition.
See e.g., Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 875 F.2d 613, 618 (7th Cir. 1989);
Abramson v. Japan Airlines Co., 739 F.2d 130, 134 (3d Cir. 1984); Beaudet v.
British Airways, PLC, 853 F. Supp. 1062, 1072 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Fischer v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1064, 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Rolnick v. El Al
Israel Airlines, Ltd., 551 F. Supp. 261, 264 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). The court further noted
that" '[wihere there is no 'accident' the Warsaw Convention is probably inapplicable
and the passenger may proceed to use local law to prove a claim.'" Tseng, 122 F.3d
at 105. (quoting Lawrence B. Goldhirsch, THE WARSAW CONVENTION ANNOTATED: A
LEGAL HANDBOOK 62 (1988)). The court, however, also noted that the Fifth Circuit
found that "' [tihe Convention's goals of uniformity and certainty would be
frustrated were we to allow Mrs. Potter to assert her state law claims, even where
the Convention does not provide her a remedy.' "Id. at 106 (quoting Potter v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., 98 F.3d 881, 885 (5th Cir. 1996)).
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Convention.36 In fact, the Supreme Court reversed the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.37 The Court held
that "recovery for a personal injury suffered 'on board [an]
aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or
disembarking,' s3 8 is unavailable if those injuries are not
recoverable under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.3 9
C. Comment Objectives
This Comment analyzes whether the Warsaw Convention
provides the sole remedy for injured international air travelers
and critiques the Supreme Court's decision in El Al Israel
Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng.40 Part I describes the pertinent facts of
the Tseng case. Part II sets forth the Warsaw Convention's
framework and history and exposes the elements of the Warsaw
Convention's relevant articles, while illuminating the newly
ratified Montreal Protocol No. 4. Part III surveys the decisions
made by the various circuit courts on this issue. Part IV
deconstructs the central issue of this case using the question
presented as it appeared in the Petitioner's Brief to the Supreme
Court. This Comment's analysis interprets the significance and
consequences of the definition of "accident" and the ramifications
of exclusive remedies. Part V carefully examines the Supreme
Court's analysis in light of the arguments advocated by this
Comment. Part VI continues with a review of Justice Stevens'
dissent in this case. Finally, this Comment concludes that the
Supreme Court should have affirmed the Second Circuit's
opinion and congratulates the Second Circuit for uncovering the
historically elusive Holy Grail.41
36 See El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 160 (1999).
37 See id. at 161.
38 Id. (quoting Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 17, 49 Stat. at 3018, 137
L.N.T.S. at 23).
39 See id.
40 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
41 Judge Cardamone, writing for the court, noted that their mission in resolving
the two issues before them was "reminiscent of Sir Galahad's search for the 'Holy
Grail.'" Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 122 F.3d 99, 100 (2d Cir. 1997), rev'd,
525 U.S. 155 (1999). The judge continued, noting that "unlike that Crusader... we
must toil in the valley, examining [materials for statutory interpretation]." Id.
20001
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I. THE TSENG FACTS 42
On May 22, 1993, Ms. Tseng, the plaintiff, a New York
resident and clinical nutritionist, 43 went to John F. Kennedy
International Airport in Queens, New York to board a flight to
Tel Aviv, Israel.44 After presenting her airline ticket and U.S.
passport to a security guard, and while awaiting check-in, she
was questioned as to her reasons for taking the trip.45 According
to the El Al security guard, she gave "illogical"46 answers in
response to the otherwise routine questions regarding the
purpose for her trip, and thus Ms. Tseng was classified as a
"high risk"47 passenger.48 As per El Al's security procedures, she
was then taken to a small, private, sparsely furnished room
where both she and her belongings were searched for "explosives
or detonating devices."49
As instructed by two El Al security employees, one male and
the other female, Ms. Tseng placed all of her luggage on a
security table.50 The security guards emptied the contents of her
luggage, as well as her purse, into small baskets. 51 The security
guards then proceeded, baskets in hand, to "another room into
which [Ms. Tseng] was not allowed to follow." 52 Then the female
42 Warsaw Convention cases usually turn on the facts peculiar to each case.
The split among the circuit courts involves hairpin turns of interpretation, and
slight variances and inferences within the reading and understanding of the
Articles of the Warsaw Convention. Therefore, the facts of the Tseng case are
included so as to facilitate analysis. The facts of the case are taken from the district
court's opinion, the Second Circuit Court's opinion as well as newspaper articles.
There were conspicuous gaps in the facts in each opinion, but the Second Circuit
Court's narration of the events appeared more complete and detailed than that of
the district court. Where appropriate, the record of each is cited.
43 See Shaw, supra note 1, at A19 (noting that the plaintiff was a New York
woman who was employed as a clinical nutritionist at Beth Israel North Medical
Center).
4 See Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 919 F. Supp. 155, 157 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), aff/d in part, rev'd in part, 122 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997), rev'd, 525 U.S. 155
(1999).
45 See Tseng, 122 F.3d at 101.
46 Id. (stating that "no explanation of why they were considered [illogical] is in
the record").
47 Id. This classification apparently led to the plaintiffs treatment by the
airline's personnel.
48 See id.
49 Id.; see also Tseng, 919 F. Supp. at 157 (noting that Tseng was "taken to a
small room with a few chairs and a table").
50 See Tseng, 919 F. Supp. at 157.
51 See id.
52 Id.
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security guard subjected Ms. Tseng to an extensive full body
search.53 Ms. Tseng was asked to remove her jacket, sweater,
and shoes.54 She was also asked to open and lower her blue
jeans to "mid-hip" level.55  The body search, conducted
exclusively by the female security guard, consisted of a full-body
above the clothing manual search, including the breasts and
groin area of Ms. Tseng.56  The "security search"57 lasted
approximately fifteen minutes. 58
When it was finally determined that Ms. Tseng was not a
security risk, she was allowed to board the flight.5 9 Ms. Tseng
claimed that as a direct result of her detainment and search at
El Al's terminal in New York, she "was really sick and very
upset"60 throughout the flight to Israel.61 Further, she also
testified that she was "emotionally traumatized and disturbed"62
during her entire stay in Israel.6 3 She returned to New York
approximately one month later.64 Upon her return to New York,
Ms. Tseng sought professional medical and psychiatric care,
which included treatment for "headaches, upset stomach, ringing
in her ears, nervousness and sleeplessness." 65
Finally, while en route to Israel, Ms. Tseng was unable to
find several items and personal effects that ostensibly should
have been in her carry-on bag and purse.66 Tseng could not find
her Rolex watch, jade ring, camera, and $1,000 in cash.67
Furthermore, Tseng inspected her clothes and found them
stained and damaged.68 Upon arriving in Tel Aviv, Israel, she
53 See Tseng, 122 F.3d at 101.
54 See id.
55 Id.
6 See id.
57 Id. The court noted that "[tihe term 'security search' refers to an intrusive
search of a passenger's body initiated after a routine check by metal detector and
questioning have led airline personnel to deem a passenger a security risk." Id.
5s See id.
59 See id.
60 Id.
61 See id.
62 Id.
63 See id.
64 See id.
65 See Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 919 F. Supp. 155, 157 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), afftd in part, rev'd in part, 122 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997), rev'd, 525 U.S. 155
(1999).
66 See id.; see also Tseng, 122 F.3d at 101.
67 See Tseng, 919 F. Supp. at 157; Tseng, 122 F.3d at 101.
68 See Tseng, 919 F. Supp. at 157.
20001
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telephoned the airline's office to inquire about her property.69
According to Ms. Tseng, an employee of El Al told her that she
would have to take up the complaint upon her return to New
York, and that El Al "was not interested in [her] missing
items."70 Ms. Tseng did just that. On July 1, 1993, Ms. Tseng
presented in writing a full accounting of her missing or damaged
property.71 When she did not receive a satisfactory result from
El Al in response to her letter, Ms. Tseng brought suit against
the airline.72
II. THE WARSAW CONVENTION: ITS CONTROVERSIAL ARTICLES
AND THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL
The following is a discussion of the basic elements of the
articles of the Warsaw Convention that were crucial to the
Court's, as well as this Comment's, analysis of El Al Israel
Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng.73 Moreover, the recent ratification of the
Montreal Protocol No. 4 by the United States Senate will
unquestionably re-calibrate the mechanism for applying the
Warsaw Convention and the scope and reach of these articles.
A. Article 17
Article 17 is perhaps the most prominent of all the Warsaw
Convention's forty-one articles.74  It is this article that
determines, under its provisions, if a passenger's injury is within
the scope of the Warsaw Convention.7 5 Article 17 provides that:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of
the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury
suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the
damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the
course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.76
A simple and unencumbered reading of Article 17 provides
69 See Tseng, 122 F.3d at 101.
70 Id.
71 See id.
72 See id.
73 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
74 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 3.
75 Article 17 is written in a way that clearly indicates that the clauses and
parts of the article are to be read as inter-connecting parts to a larger more intricate
whole.
76 Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 17, 49 Stat. at 3018, 137
L.N.T.S. at 23.
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for certain elements, all of which must be met, in order for the
Warsaw Convention to apply with respect to liability and
recovery for personal injury: (1) the passenger must have
suffered either a wounding, bodily injury, or death;77 (2) the
sustained physical injury or death must have been the result of
an accident,78 and (3) the accident must have occurred, either on
board the aircraft or during the process of embarking or
disembarking.79
Therefore, if a passenger sustains a physical injury or even
death, but not during an "accident," while on board the aircraft
or during the process of embarking or disembarkings° from the
aircraft, Article 17 does not apply. The main disagreement
among the courts with regard to Article 17 is the definition and
parameters of the word "accident."81 Deciding whether an
accident has occurred conclusively determines whether
Article 17 applies.
77 See id.
78 See id.
79 See id.
80 Generally, this element of Article 17 is easily met. The meanings of both
"embark" and "disembark" have been afforded very liberal constructions, as courts
have been willing to look at the surrounding circumstances of a passenger's
situation at the time of injury. See, e.g., Robert A. Brazener, Annotation, When is
Passenger on Aircraft in International Transportation Embarking or Disembarking
Within Meaning of Article 17 of Warsaw Convention, 39 A.L.R. FED. 452, 456 (1978)
(elaborating on the various meanings of "embark" and "disembark," providing
numerous cases depicting courts granting a wide range of latitude in the area, and
explaining that "the courts will take into account the totality of circumstances at the
time of the passenger injury, including.., location of the passenger ... activities
being performed by the passenger, and the degree of control being exercised over the
passenger by the carrier").
81 The Warsaw Convention was drafted in French and does not include a
definition section. Therefore, it has been left to the common law to interpret the
definitions of key words, which should be terms of art with unambiguous meanings.
The various decisions have combined to produce a patchwork of understanding as to
certain key provisions of some of the articles. Thus, it is possible to gain a more
complete understanding of the law and the direction in which the courts are
leaning. For example, the Supreme Court has decided that for the purposes of
Article 17, an accident is "an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is
external to the passenger." Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985) (holding
that a normally finctioning pressurization system that caused a passenger to lose
hearing in one ear was not an accident because the unusual happening was internal
to the passenger). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has decided that a hijacking
is an accident within the meaning of Article 17. See Pflug v. Egyptair Corp., 961
F.2d 26, 28-29 (2d Cir. 1992).
2000] 237
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B. Article 24
Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention is of primary
importance in analyzing the current controversy before the
Supreme Court.8 2 Article 24 provides that:
(1) In the cases covered by articles 18 and 19 any action for
damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to the
conditions and limits set out in this convention.
(2) In the cases covered by article 17 the provisions of the
preceding paragraph shall also apply, without prejudice to the
questions as to who are the persons who have the right to bring
suit and what are their respective rights.83
In section 2, Article 24 relates back to govern Article 17.
Article 24 essentially declares that an action for damages by a
passenger against an airline based on an Article 17 "violation"8 4
must be brought within the limits enunciated in the Warsaw
Convention. Thus, one may be precluded from bringing suit
against an airline under the Warsaw Convention if the
conditions and elements of Article 17 are not met. The most
elusive issue is what it means when a case "covered" 5 by
82 Article 24 is the section from which the argument and controversy of
preemption emanates. The Second, Third, and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals are
split on the issue of whether a state law claim is preempted when Article 17 of the
Convention does not apply to the facts of a plaintiff passenger's claim. See Tseng v.
El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 122 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding "where the
Convention is inapplicable, a plaintiff may seek recourse under state law"), rev'd,
525 U.S. 155 (1999); Potter v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 98 F.3d 881, 885 (5th Cir. 1996)
(stating "[tihe Convention's goals of uniformity and certainty would be frustrated
were we to allow Mrs. Potter to assert her state law claims, even where the
Convention does not provide her a remedy"); Onyeanusi v. Pan Am, 952 F.2d 788,
793 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting "[wlhen the Warsaw Convention applies, it is the
exclusive remedy for actions against air carriers").
83 Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 24(1)-(2), 49 Stat. at 3020, 137
L.N.T.S. at 27.
84 The word "violation" is perhaps a misnomer in this situation. Article 17 is a
strict liability statute. Once all of the elements are met, liability attaches. The
Convention, however, also states that "[t]he carrier shall not be liable if he proves
that he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or
that it was impossible for him or them to take such measures." Warsaw Convention,
supra note 3, art. 20(1), 49 Stat. at 3019, 137 L.N.T.S. at 25.
85 What are the implications when it is said that a case is "covered by Article
17"? There are two basic, plausible positions of interpretation. The first is that the
Warsaw Convention "covers" only those injuries caused by an "accident" in between
the process of embarking and disembarking. In other words, when all of the
elements of Article 17 are met, Article 24(2) says that the Warsaw Convention will
not apply, and will not "cover" those cases that fail to meet the elements under
Article 17, and a passenger may bring his claim based on state law. In this
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Article 17.
On face value, these two provisions of Article 24 are fairly
straightforward. How a court interprets section 2 of Article 24,
however, will determine whether one may have a cause of action,
beyond that provided under Article 17, in state tort law.86
C. Article 25
Article 25 is central to the discussion of airline liability and
preemption of state law. Article 25 provides that:
(1) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the
provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his liability,
if the damage is caused by his wilful [sic] misconduct or by such
default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the court to
which the case is submitted, is considered to be equivalent to
wilful [sic] misconduct.
(2) Similarly the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of
the said provisions, if the damage is caused under the same
circumstances by any agent of the carrier acting within the
scope of his employment.87
There is a split of authority among the courts as to the
purpose of the "willful misconduct" provision contained in Article
25 of the Warsaw Convention.88 When willful misconduct is
found to have taken place, is the penalty on the airline simply a
deprivation of the benefit afforded airlines under Article 2289 of
the Warsaw Convention in the form of a cap on damages, or does
the clause "t]he carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of
the provisions of this convention 90 mean that Article 17 does not
situation, there will be no preemption. The other possible interpretation and
reading of Article 24(2) is that Article 17 "covers" all cases of potential injury, but
protects the airline carrier and limits its liability to cases that fall within the
requirements of Article 17. Therefore, if the elements of Article 17 are not met, for
example, if there was no accident, or the injury took place prior to embarkation or
after disembarkation, not only would Article 17 not apply, but any other cause of
action, including a state law claim, would be preempted. In such a situation, there
would be no recourse for the unfortunate injured passenger. See Coleman, supra
note 2, at 193-94.
86 See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
87 Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 25(1)-(2), 49 Stat. at 3020, 137
L.N.T.S. at 27.
88 See infra note 90.
89 Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention sets the limits on liability. Recently, as
a result of the Montreal Protocol No. 4, the cap on damages has been raised from
$75,000 (U.S.) to $145,000 (U.S.).
OD Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 25(1), 49 Stat. at 3020, 137
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apply at all?9 The debate becomes relevant only when a
passenger sustains injury that would otherwise place her
squarely within Article 17 but for the willful misconduct of the
carrier. The willful misconduct, however, may trigger a state
law cause of action.92 This would only be the case, of course, if it
were determined that the Warsaw Convention does not preempt
state law claims when Article 17 is determined to be
inapplicable.
D. The Montreal Protocol
The Montreal Protocol No. 493 ("Protocol") was written to
amend the Warsaw Convention of October 12, 1929, which had
been previously amended by the protocol executed at the Hague
on September 28, 1955.94 The Protocol was signed in Montreal
on September 25, 1975. 95 The United States, however, did not
ratify the Protocol until September 28, 1998.96
Specifically, as it relates to this Comment, the Protocol
deleted the Warsaw Convention's Article 24 and replaced it with
the following language:
L.N.T.S. at 27.
91 For example, one court contended that Article 25 and Article 17 are not
mutually exclusive and that a new cause of action cannot arise from the conditions
set forth in Article 25. The court held that Article 25 relates directly to Article 22
which in turn governs Article 17, and that "[iun cases of willfil misconduct, Article
25 strips the carrier of the liability limitation on compensatory damages." Floyd v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462, 1483 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd on other grounds,
499 U.S. 530 (1991). Another court, however, held that when willful misconduct is
present, Article 17 is no longer applicable to the facts in question. See In re
Hijacking of Pan American World Airways, Inc., Aircraft at Karachi Int'l Airport,
Pakistan on Sept. 5, 1986, 729 F. Supp. 17, 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
92 For this "lucky" plaintiff, it would be solely the act of the willful misconduct
on behalf of the airline that would grasp the cause of action out of the jaws of the
Warsaw Convention and lay it gently into the familiar and more accommodating
environs of state law.
93 Montreal Protocol No. 4 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on Oct.
12, 1929, as amended by the Protocol done at the Hague on Sep. 8, 1955 [hereinafter
Montreal Protocol No. 4], ratified by the U.S. on Sept. 28, 1998, reprinted in S.
EXEC. REP. No. 105-20 (1998).
94 See id.
95 See id.
96 See El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 175 n.14 (1999) (noting
that "[tihe President signed the instrument of ratification for Montreal Protocol No.
4 on November 5, 1998"); 144 Cong. Rec. S11059 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1998). The
Protocol entered into force in the United States ninety days later, on March 4, 1999
as per the procedure delineated in the Protocol. See id.
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In the carriage of passengers and baggage, any action for
damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to the
conditions and limits set out in this Convention, without
prejudice to the question as to who are the persons who have
the right to bring suit and what are their respective rights.97
The Protocol chose not to use the more restrictive language
"[i]n the cases covered by Article 17."98 Rather, the Protocol
changed this clause to use language such as "any action,"99
"however founded,"100 and "without prejudice" 101 to describe the
claims that may be brought under the Warsaw Convention. The
Protocol excluded the possibility of bringing any claims under
state law. Clearly, the Protocol imposed the Warsaw Convention
as the sole remedy for passengers seeking relief for their claims
as a result of damages they have suffered. These damages would
always be "subject to the conditions and limits of liability set
out"10 2 in the Warsaw Convention.
The Protocol not only completely rewrote the old Article 24
of the Warsaw Convention, but it also replaced the Warsaw
Convention's Article 25 with the following language:
In the carriage of passengers and baggage, the limits of liability
specified in Article 22 shall not apply if it is proved that the
damage resulted from an act or omission of the carrier, his
servants or agents, done with intent to cause damage or
recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably
result; provided that, in the case of such act or omission of a
servant or agent, it is also proved that he was acting within the
scope of his employment.'0 3
Two significant changes are present in the new version of
Article 25. First, the revision eliminated the high standard of
"wilful misconduct"10 4 and replaced it with a lower standard of
97 Montreal Protocol No. 4, supra note 93, art. VIII, reprinted in S. EXEC. REP.
No. 105-20, at 29 (1998).
98 Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 24(2), 49 Stat. at 3020, 137 L.N.T.S.
at 27; see also id., art. 17, 49 Stat. at 3018, 137 L.N.T.S. at 23.
99 Montreal Protocol No. 4, supra note 93, art. VIII, reprinted in S. EXEC. REP.
No. 105-20, at 29 (1998).
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Montreal Protocol No. 4, supra note 93, art. IX, reprinted in S. EXEC. REP.
No. 105-20, at 29 (1998).
104 Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 25, 49 Stat. at 3020, 137 L.N.T.S. at
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culpable conduct. The language in the new Article 25 describes
this lower burden. Now, a plaintiff need only show that the
circumstances surrounding his injury were "done with intent to
cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage
would probably result."10 5 Second, the new Article 25 expressly
refers to Article 22, illustrating the intention of the Protocol to
not create a new cause of action for reckless behavior. The new
version of Article 25 keeps all reckless or willful actions within
the Protocol's purview but removes the limits of liability
provided by Article 22 upon proof of the lower standard of
culpable conduct. 0 6
III. THE SPLIT AMONG THE CIRCUIT COURTS CRIES OUT FOR
CLOSURE
The circuit courts have split over whether state law causes
of action are preempted by the Warsaw Convention once it has
been decided that an "accident" has not taken place within the
meaning of Article 17. If the incident is not a case within the
confines of Article 17, the question becomes whether the reading
of "cases covered" cited in Article 24 serves to preempt or, rather,
to invite a claim based on state tort law.
The Supreme Court confronted the preemption issue for the
first time in El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng 0 7 Until this
decision, the different holdings and interpretations of the circuit
courts were inapposite of the purpose for which the Warsaw
Convention was created-to create uniformity and limit
potential airline liability.
In Abramson v. Japan Airlines, Co.,108 the United States
105 Montreal Protocol No. 4, supra note 93, art. IX, reprinted in S. EXEC. REP.
No. 105-20, at 29 (1998).
106 See id. (providing that "the limits of liability specified in Article 22 shall not
apply [upon proof of the culpable conduct as outlined in Article 251").
107 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
108 739 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1984). In Abramson, the plaintiff, Mr. Abramson, and
his wife were flying to Tokyo from New York. See id. at 131. Mr. Abramson suffered
an attack from a pre-existing hernia. See id. His wife asked a stewardess if her
husband could perform his usual "self-help" remedy, which consisted of "lying down,
massaging his stomach... [and] occasional[ly]... self-induced vomiting." Id.
Though there were "nine empty seats in the first class section," the stewardess
advised Mr. Abramson's wife that there were no empty seats. Id. Mr. Abramson
contended that, as a result of being told there was no space for him to perform his
self-help remedy, he was prevented from ameliorating his condition. See id. Mr.
Abramson's condition worsened, requiring hospitalization upon landing, and an
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Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in reversing the district
court's holding, analyzed the situation by reasoning that, "[slince
we have already concluded that Abrams on's injury was not
covered by Article 17 because there was no 'accident,' Article
24(2) does not by its express terms limit maintenance of actions
brought under local law."10 9 Thus, the Third Circuit construed
the phrase "cases covered" in Article 24(2) to apply to those cases
in which there would be Article 17 strict liability.110 Therefore,
according to the Third Circuit, the Warsaw Convention did not
preempt state law claims.
In Potter v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,"' the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in affirming the district court's
granting of summary judgment to the defendant airline,
analyzed the situation by looking to sources external to the
Warsaw Convention itself.112 The court looked to the purpose of
the Warsaw Convention and the need to preserve the drafters'
intent to create uniformity within the international airline
immediate return to the United States for surgery. See id. The district court granted
summary judgment to the airline, reasoning that Article 17 did not apply absent a
showing that an accident had taken place. See id. Consequently, as per the district
court, if Article 17 were no longer relevant, there could be no cause of action. The
Third Circuit noted the district court's holding that, "the absence of an 'accident'
precludes liability, both compensatory and punitive, under the state law negligence
and willful misconduct claims." Id. at 131-32 (internal quotations and citation
omitted). The Third Circuit concluded, however, that it was error for the district
court below to have not reached the state law claims, expressly holding that
"alternative theories of recovery" are not barred "[wihen the Warsaw Convention is
inapplicable." Id. at 135; see also Coleman, supra note 2, at 212-16 (discussing the
Third Circuit approach in Abramson as to preemptive state law claims).
109 Abramson, 739 F.2d at 134.
110 See id. at 134-35.
M 98 F.3d 881 (5th Cir. 1996). The plaintiff, Mrs. Potter, while on a plane en
route to Europe, tried to maneuver back into her seat on her way back from the
lavatory. See id. at 882-83. Mrs. Potter's foot got stuck on the carpet, resulting in a
twisted knee and torn ligaments. See id. at 883. She subsequently brought suit
against Delta Air Lines. See id. The district court granted summary judgment to the
defendant, reasoning that because there was no "accident," Article 17 did not apply
and, further, that the Warsaw Convention's Article 17 provided the exclusive
remedy. See id. at 882-83. Thus, Article 17 preempts a state law cause of action. See
id.; see also Coleman, supra note 2, at 222 (detailing the facts in Potter).
112 See Potter, 98 F.3d at 885-87 (examining case law that provided a test for
non-express preemption). In Potter, the court recognized that there was no express
preemption in the Warsaw Convention. See id. at 885. Therefore, the court
considered whether a non-express preemption could be implied by determining
"whether (1) the area requires uniformity vital to national interests... (2) there is
evidence of congressional design to preempt the field.., or (3) the state statute
actually conflicts with the federal provision." Id. at 885.
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industry.113  The court determined that reading Article 17
together with Article 24 resulted in an implied preemption of
any state law claims. 114 The conflict with regard to the Warsaw
Convention's preemption had therefore involved the Second
Circuit (Tseng), Third Circuit (Abramson), and the Fifth Circuit
(Potter).
IV. THE QUESTION PRESENTED
It is clear that various federal courts, especially the circuit
courts, have been wrestling with the Warsaw Convention for
many years.115  As the volume of international air travel
continues to increase year after year, the articles and provisions
of the Warsaw Convention become more relevant and of more
import to growing numbers of people. Yet, the split of authority
in the circuit courts frustrated the Warsaw's Conventions twin
goals of uniformity and certainty. The Tseng case presented the
Supreme Court with the opportunity to resolve the precise issue
that had confounded the circuit courts: "Whether the Warsaw
Convention, a treaty of the United States, exclusively governs
and precludes any recovery for a passenger's injuries sustained
in the course of 'international transportation' if the injuries were
not caused by an 'accident' within the meaning of Article 17 of
the Convention?"116
The petitioner, El Al Israel Airlines, had honed the issue
down to this precise question. On its face, it seemed as though
the petitioner had only asked one straightforward question.
Upon further reflection, however, the issue turns out to be quite
complex. In order to facilitate this Comment's discussion of the
preemption issue, it is necessary to parse the above question into
its fundamental elements, and to reason towards an ultimate
conclusion.
A. Step One: What is an "accident"?
Clearly, something planned or routine is not an accident.
An accident involves an unplanned event that is neither
expected, predicted, nor orchestrated. Still, an accident is
113 See id. at 885-86.
114 See id.
115 See supra notes 108-14.
116 Brief for Petitioner, El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999)
(No. 97-475), available in 1998 WL 401526, at *i.
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something that is not only unexpected, but is also not the norm.
It is infrequent, unusual, and something that connotes fear and
unrest. Sometimes a physical injury and loss of some ability or
talent accompany an accident, at least for temporary periods of
time.
The expectations of the parties involved may shed some light
on the parameters of an accident. To illustrate the role
expectations play, consider a roller coaster ride at an amusement
park. Two friends board a small, metal car in order to climb and
otherwise zigzag around a complicated structure for a fine and
challenging visceral four minutes of speed, wind, and
excitement. If, when the ride comes to an end, one of the friends
becomes ill, while the other is perfectly fine, can we in good
conscience say that an accident has occurred? Probably not.
This would be the case even if they both had ridden the machine
many times before, because ultimately this reaction is not that
uncommon nor is it a remote possibility. The sick rider's
condition could have been caused by the rider's recent diet and
ingestion of food, or because the rider was suffering from the side
effects of alcohol or medication. The rider's condition could also
be at least partially self-induced by a neurotic, over-active
psyche. In any event, one would be hard pressed to consider the
rider's reaction an "accident."
By contrast, if the roller coaster derailed, or a piece of the
track itself gave way, throwing the occupants from the car, the
resulting physical and emotional injuries would be the result of
an "accident." In other words, the roller coaster was not expected
to derail or throw the occupants from the car. Yet, in the first
example, the uneventful roller coaster ride caused different
people to have differing physical, and possibly emotional,
reactions to the very same routine ride without there being an
"accident" in the conventional sense of the word. The initial
question, then, is whether a given event is not only an accident,
but an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17.
Specifically, the issue becomes whether the security search
in Tseng constituted an "accident." In order to answer this
question, it is vital to keep in mind that security searches at
airline terminals, particularly at international airline terminals,
are not only routine, but necessary.117 Furthermore, El Al
11 The FAA has regulations that require airlines to implement security
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Airlines, the national airline of the State of Israel,118 must be
especially careful in light of Israel's precarious position, both
geographically and ideologically, in the world today.1 9 In Air
France v. Saks,120 the Supreme Court, without the benefit of a
definition section for the Warsaw Convention, described the
word "accident" as "an unexpected or unusual event or
happening that is external to the passenger."121 The Court then
observed that, "when the injury indisputably results from the
passenger's own internal reaction to the usual, normal, and
expected operation of the aircraft, it has not been caused by an
accident."122 The federal judicial system is replete with rulings
as to what is not considered an "accident" within the meaning of
Article 17 and the Warsaw Convention. For example, "events
such as a passenger's death by natural causes, fights between
passengers, routine re-pressurization of the aircraft, and injuries
resulting from intoxication,"123 were all deemed not to be
included within the definition of "accident."
This Comment posits that a fifteen-minute body search,
during a routine security check, cannot be considered an
"accident," particularly at an airline known to be very strict and
meticulous when checking people in for boarding their flights.
Tseng's subjective feelings during and after the security check
are irrelevant as to whether an accident occurred. As the Second
procedures to prevent terrorist attacks. See Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 122
F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1997), rev'd, 525 U.S. 155 (1999); see also 14 C.F.R.
§ 129.25(b), (g) (1999) (requiring security checks and safety measures to be in place,
and mandating that the airline deny transportation to anyone who refuses to
consent to a security check).
118 See William A. Orme Jr., El Al at a Turning Point; A Mirror of Israel's
Divisions Prepares to Go 49% Public, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1999, at C1 (stating that
El Al Airlines is "the Israeli international flag carrier").
119 El Al Airlines follows strict security measures because of "[ilts history as a
terrorist target." Id. El Al Airlines is "perhaps the most security-conscious carrier in
the world... [and that] baggage inspections and pre-flight security checks are
carried out in deadly earnest, with the company's own state-of-the-art equipment
and specially trained personnel." Id.
120 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
121 Saks, 470 U.S. at 405.
122 Id. at 406. The reasoning of the Supreme Court is analogous to the roller
coaster hypothetical above, focusing on external events for accidents, and not on the
internal reactions of a passenger.
123 John R. Schmertz, Jr. & Mike Meier, In Suit Against El Al Airlines, Second
Circuit Rules that Intrusive Body Search of Female Passenger Not "Accident"
Covered by Warsaw Convention But That Passenger May Pursue Injury Claims in
State Courts, 3 INT'L L. UPDATE 7 (1997).
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Circuit held: "[Elven though the event of which plaintiff
complains occurred during the course of her embarkation on
defendant's airplane, there was no accident and she suffered no
bodily injury."124
B. Step Two: If and When is the Warsaw Convention the
"Exclusive" Remedy for Passenger Injuries?
Central to the present case is whether the Warsaw
Convention provides the exclusive remedy for passengers injured
during the course of international air travel, thereby precluding
and preempting a state law claim.'2 As described in Part II.B.,
there are arguments to be raised on both sides of this issue. The
interrelationship between Articles 17, 24, and 25 determines the
extent to which, if at all, the Warsaw Convention can preempt
state law claims.
Krys v. Lufthansa German Airlines126 illustrated the
intricacies of the Warsaw Convention and its provisions.127 The
Krys case underscored the need to balance the interests of the
passenger and those of the airline. Krys also emphasized the
uncertainty inherent in the delicate balancing of those
interests. 28 The plaintiff in Krys suffered a heart attack on
board a plane en route to Europe. 29 The decision makers on the
plane-captain, lead crew personnel, etc.-as per the advice of a
doctor on board the flight, thought it unnecessary to make an
emergency landing. 30 Mr. Krys sued the airline claiming that
although it was not the proximate cause of his injury, the
airline's negligence in not landing sooner exacerbated his
medical condition. 31 Initially, the defendant airline, relying on
Potter v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 32 argued that because there was
no accident, Article 17 did not apply.133 Further, the defendant
argued that the Warsaw Convention and Article 17 preempted
124 Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 122 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1997), rev'd,
525 U.S. 155 (1999).
125 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
126 119 F.3d 1515 (11th Cir. 1997).
127 See Coleman, supra note 2, at 198.
18 See id.
12 See Krys v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 119 F.3d 1515, 1517 (11th Cir.
1997).
130 See id.
131 See id.
132 98 F.3d 881 (5th Cir. 1996).
133 See Krys, 119 F.3d at 1518 n.8; see also Coleman, supra note 2, at 198.
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any other claim, irrespective of whether Article 17 was
applicable or not. 34 In response to the plaintiffs reply, however,
and with severe uncertainty as to how the Eleventh Circuit was
going to decide vis-d-vis the other circuit courts, the defendant
reversed course and sought to insulate itself within the limited
liability of the Warsaw Convention. 135 The defendant airline,
therefore, argued that an accident had indeed taken place. 3 6
Though perhaps a good legal tactic, this strategy certainly
highlights the need for a uniform rule on this issue.
The plain text of the treaty,137 including the terminology
"cases covered by Article 17" as stated in Article 24(2), combined
with the direct wording and structure of the elements in Article
17, clearly indicate that the Warsaw Convention is not the
exclusive remedy for injured airline passengers. Further, the
Supreme Court has noted that "treaties are construed more
liberally than private agreements, and to ascertain their
meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of
the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction
adopted by the parties."138 Accordingly, the Second Circuit, in
Tseng, cited to a variety of evidence that supported the finding
that the drafters of the treaty did not view the treaty as an
exclusive remedy. 139
This Comment advocates the position that the Warsaw
Convention is, not an exclusive remedy to those passengers
injured during the course of international air travel.
Specifically, Article 17 becomes irrelevant when its elements are
not met. In other words, the phrase "cases covered by Article 17"
14 See Krys, 119 F.3d at 1517, 1518 n.8.
135 See Krys, 119 F.3d at 1518 n.8; see also Coleman, supra note 2, at 198-199.
136 See Krys, 119 F.3d at 1518 n.8.
137 A good starting point when construing treaties is the plain meaning analysis
of the language of the agreement itself. See generally David J. Bederman, Revivalist
Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REV. 953 (1994).
138 Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943).
139 See Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 122 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1997),
rev'd, 525 U.S. 155 (1999). Rather, the drafters assumed that passengers would
have recourse to national law in specific cases. See id. ("[Tihe French delegate
exclaimed that 'naturally' the common law would apply [to cases excluded from the
Convention under Article 34]."). The court also noted that when the
Czechoslovakian delegation learned that the Warsaw Convention's name was
changed to refer to the Unification of "Certain Rules," it withdrew its proposed
article that stated, "[i]n the absence of provisions in the present Convention, the
provisions of laws and national rules relative to carriage in each State shall apply."
Id.
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in Article 24(2) refers only to those cases where injury is caused
by an "accident" occurring on board the aircraft itself, or during
the process of embarking and disembarking the aircraft. The
limiting language of Article 24(2) logically implies that there are
cases not covered by Article 17. Therefore, if all of the elements
of Article 17 are not met, Article 24(2) instructs that the Warsaw
Convention will not apply, and will not "cover" those cases that
fail to meet these elements. Because the limits of liability are
only to be imposed on cases covered under Article 17, the
Convention's limitations should not apply to cases not covered by
Article 17. Consequently, a passenger whose injury is not within
the ambit of Article 17 should be able to bring his claim based on
state law because no federal preemption would have arisen
under the Convention. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit correctly decided this issue when it held that the Warsaw
Convention did not preempt a state law claim that did not meet
the elements of Article 17.140
The Warsaw Convention was drafted at a time when very
few people in America could afford international air travel. The
order of the day in the 1920s was to protect the airline industry
from potential lawsuits and other catastrophes that could
potentially bankrupt even the most solvent airline. It was not
the drafters' intent for the Warsaw Convention to be an
exclusive remedy for every injury associated with air travel. The
airline industry was concerned with potential plane crashes,
resulting in serious personal injuries and deaths that could
expose the fledgling industry to financially devastating claims.
The drafters did not envision security searches, x-ray devices,
and other modern day security precautions so ubiquitous to air
travel today. The technological capabilities of the airplane were
the source of concern. Therefore, the Warsaw Convention was
only intended to apply to an accident that resulted in physical
injury or death. Article 17 is clear on this.1 4 ' The Convention
should not be used to obliterate state tort law remedies relating
to international air travel incidents that were not directly
envisioned by the drafters.
Article 24(2) is extremely clear on its face. 42 With an
140 See id. at 108.
141 Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 17, 49 Stat. at 3018, 137 L.N.T.S. at
23.
142 See discussion supra Part II.B.
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exception made for the exact meaning of "accident," Article 17 is
arguably crystal clear as well.143 Interpreting the term "cases
covered" to mean anything more than what it means from a
plain reading of the text would be counterintuitive. If the
purpose were simply to grant the airline industry wider
protection, the question would have to be asked, at whose
expense? Furthermore, if one believes there is no preemption of
state law when the Warsaw Convention and Article 17 do not
apply, then one is not mutually excluded from believing in and
supporting the Warsaw Convention's goal of uniformity. For
those "certain rules"144 to which the Warsaw Convention applies,
the limitations apply fully and equally to all of its signatories.
Without doubt, there should be a remedy for the passenger who
slips on a wet floor and breaks a leg while waiting in line to go
through a security check. There should be a remedy as well for
the senior citizen who breaks a hip or an arm because he trips on
a broken stair, or over a torn piece of carpet, while attempting to
board the plane. In situations where the Convention does not
apply, there is no issue of uniformity. Quite simply, the drafters
did not intend the Warsaw Convention to provide absolute
uniformity of remedy for all unexpected events encountered by
international air travelers.
In fact, if one is to argue that the Warsaw Convention
presents the exclusive remedy, where are the safeguards for the
passengers? There must be a balancing of interests. For if we
were to say that the Warsaw Convention was intended to be the
sole avenue of recovery, what passenger protections would exist
to offset the potential negligence of the airlines? The deterrent
effect of tort law liability would be lost if federal preemption is
found to limit the airline's liability in all cases. Why should an
international air passenger be required to forego remedies,
thereby giving the airlines carte blanche to be as negligent as
they want to be, constrained only by the possible cost of the
Convention's low limits of liability?
In fact, the Convention allows the limits of liability to be set
aside in Article 25, but only for the small subset of events that
occur based on a standard of willful misconduct by the airline.
As mentioned earlier, Article 25 does not create a separate cause
143 See discussion supra Part II.A.
144 See supra note 2 (noting that the actual title of the treaty begins with the
words "Certain Rules").
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of action in the event of willful misconduct.145 When there is
willful misconduct, assuming the Warsaw Convention and
Article 17 otherwise apply, all that changes is that there is no
longer a safety net of limited liability. Presumably, if a plaintiff
cannot prove willful misconduct and the Warsaw Convention
preempts local tort law through Article 17, the plaintiffs limited
recovery may well inhibit recoveries from negligent airlines. The
possibility of opening the floodgates of litigation-the fear of
some scholars, airline executives, lobbyists, and even Supreme
Court Justices-are unfounded.146  Thus, uniformity and
certainty in the laws, rules, and expectations of potential
liability, are still preserved when the Warsaw Convention
applies. When the Warsaw Convention does not apply,
uniformity is a non-issue, because then the focus is on
passengers' rights. It has been an arduous task to balance and
maintain passengers' rights against the limitations imposed by
the airline-friendly Warsaw Convention. Since its inception,
however, the Convention, through Article 25, has expressly
protected passengers from instances of willful misconduct on the
part of the airlines. Though the high threshold of willful
misconduct has been supplanted by the lower standard of
reckless behavior in the Montreal Protocol No. 4,147 international
airline travelers should have access to the tort law recoveries
that would otherwise be available.
Finally, another compelling argument for non-exclusivity is
the recent ratification of the Montreal Protocol No. 4.148 The
145 See supra notes 89-91.
146 During oral arguments in the Tseng case, "Justice Stephen Breyer
speculated aloud that if the passenger's suit goes forward, 'millions of cases' could
be brought against airlines for complaints ranging from too-hot coffee to cold germs
circulated through the ventilating system." Mauro, supra note 1, at 3A. With all due
respect to Justice Breyer, why are passengers on whom coffee is spilled to be
deprived of their right to recovery? What of those passengers getting their limbs
caught in malfunctioning electronic doors? The point is simply that, contrary to
popular belief, most people do not engage in lawsuits even though they get hurt or
otherwise injured in their everyday lives at one time or another. Why is it more
important to protect the deep pockets of the international airline industry than to
allow an avenue of recovery for arguably tens of thousands of legitimate potential
plaintiffs each and every year? Was it really the intention of the drafters of the
Warsaw Convention to insulate the industry from negligence claims not directly
involving an accident within the meaning of Article 17?
147 See discussion supra Part II.D.
148 The U.S. Senate ratified the Montreal Protocol No. 4 on September 28, 1998.
See 144 CONG. REC. S11059 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1998). As per the procedure outlined
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recent ratification of the Protocol effectively made seemingly
slight, yet very significant, changes to Articles 24 and 25 of the
Warsaw Convention. 49 Logically, if the Protocol had nothing to
add, clarify or change, why would the Senate have seen a need to
ratify it? The point here is a rather straightforward one: If the
Protocol makes it clear that the Warsaw Convention preempts
state law claims, then what was the status of the Warsaw
Convention before ratification and without the amendments the
Protocol added? Presumably, the Convention was theretofore a
nonexclusive remedy.
V. THE SUPREME COURT GROUNDS TSENG
On January 12, 1999, the Supreme Court of the United
States, in an 8-1 decision, decided El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v.
Tseng.150 In an opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, reversing
the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court held that "recovery for a
personal injury suffered 'on board [an] aircraft or in the course of
any of the operations of embarking or disembarking,' if not
allowed under the Convention, is not available at all." 5 1
A. The Majority
The majority opinion concludes on three concentric levels
that Article 24 of the Convention precludes any recourse to state
law when a passenger cannot maintain a claim under Article 17
of the Convention. First, the Supreme Court interpreted the
French phrase "les cas pr6vus h l'rticle 17"152 as "refer[ring]
generically to all personal injury cases stemming from
occurrences on board an aircraft or in embarking or
disembarking, and simply distinguished that class of Article 17
cases from cases involving damaged luggage or goods, or
delay." 5 3 Tseng and the Second Circuit interpreted the above
phrase to include "those cases in which a passenger could
in the Warsaw Convention, the Protocol entered into force on March 4, 1999, 119
days after the President signed the instrument of ratification. See El Al Israel
Airlines v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 175 n.14 (1999).
149 See discussion supra Part II.D.
150 525 U.S. 155 (1999). Justice Stevens was the lone dissenter. See id. at 177.
151 Id. at 161 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
152 Id. at 167 n.11 (noting that when the phrase is literally translated, it means
"'the cases anticipated by Article 17'" or "'the cases provided for by Article 17,'
(citations omitted)).
153 Id. at 168.
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actually maintain a claim for relief under Article 17."154 Thus,
the Supreme Court found that "Article 24 would preclude a
passenger from asserting any air transit personal injury claims
under local law."155 The Second Circuit's approach is more
consistent with the interests of justice, and stands in sharp
contrast to the conclusory rationale adopted by the Supreme
Court. If the French phrase quoted above was meant to include
all possible cases, even those claims which are unsustainable
under Article 17, then what is the purpose of the additional
wording of "l'rticle 17"? The Court, however, gave great weight
to the views of the Executive Branch regarding the construction
and application of the phrase. 156
This Comment asserts that this is an overbroad and
overinclusive application of the original text of the Convention.
It is speculative and takes advantage of a phrase that is at best
ambiguous, and, at worst, opportunistic. The French phrase
includes the wording "l'rticle 17," which properly grants an
airline passenger more rights through a very narrow
interpretation of the original drafters' intentions.
Second, the Court proffered that the Montreal Protocol No. 4
amended an already preemptive-albeit unclear-Article 24 of
the Convention.'57 In other words, the Court understood the
Protocol as an amendment of clarification rather than one of
addition or subtraction. Today, the preemptive force of the
Warsaw Convention as a result of the Protocol is unequivocal. 158
It is submitted that the pre-amended Article 24 did not demand
preemption when one could not maintain a claim under Article
17. Rather, the "revised Article 24 provides for preemption not
14 Id.
155 Id.
156 See id. (noting that "the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the
Government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to
great weight'" (quoting Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176,
184-85 (1982))).
157 See id. at 174-75.
158 The Montreal Protocol No. 4 states: "In the carriage of passengers and
baggage, any action for damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to
the conditions and limits set out in this Convention .... " Montreal Protocol No. 4,
supra note 93, art. VIII, reprinted in S. EXEC. REP. No. 105-20, at 29 (1998)
(amending Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention) (emphasis added). It is now clear
that the Warsaw Convention is an injured party's only avenue of recovery. If one
fails to meet the elements spelled out in Article 17, recourse to a state tort law
remedy will be foreclosed.
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earlier established."' 59 It defies credulity that the Supreme
Court could genuinely posit that an elaborate and all-
encompassing Montreal Protocol No. 4 amended the pre-World
War II Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention only to achieve what
the treaty had accomplished some 65 years earlier. The Warsaw
Convention is inarguably ambiguous. The fact that 'federal
preemption of state law generally occurs only when the federal
law's directives are clear or when absolutely necessary pursuant
to public policy concerns; and the necessity and existence of the
Montreal Protocol No.4, all support this conclusion. It is more
logical, as this Comment submits, that the pre-amended Article
24 of the Warsaw Convention should not have been interpreted
to preempt those claims which fall outside the requirements of
Article 17.
Finally, the Court observed that "[tihe cardinal purpose of
the Warsaw Convention... is to 'achiev[e] uniformity of rules
governing claims arising from international air
transportation.' "160 While it is certainly accurate that the
drafters of the Warsaw Convention wished to provide uniformity
among its signatories, uniformity was only aspired to in those
situations expressly provided for in the treaty's provisions. In a
situation such as Tseng's, therefore, the drafters probably did
not even conceive of such a claim. Hence, they were not
concerned with uniformity in non-Article 17 type situations. In
looking for support in the British House of Lords, the Court once
again relied on another misconstruction of the Convention's
provisions. 161
159 See Tseng, 525 U.S. at 174-75 (explaining Tseng's position that federal
preemption of state law is generally disfavored particularly in the areas of health
and safety, and alluding to Justice Stevens' dissent that unless a treaty's intention
is clear, as with other pieces of federal legislation, it should not given an overbroad
reading and preempt able and existing state law); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (discussing the presumptions against preemption with
regard to the federal preemption of state causes of action in relation to medical
devices).
160 Tseng, 525 U.S. at 170 (quoting Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd 499 U.S. 530,
552 (1991)).
161 See id. at 173-74. The Tseng Court used the reasoning in Sidhu v. British
Airways plc., 1 All E.R. 193 (H.L. 1997), to show that the word "certain," as used in
the Convention's title, applied only to certain types of rules governing certain types
of situations. See Tseng, 525 U.S. at 173. For example, the Convention would not
apply to an airline's obligation to carry insurance. The Convention is "'a partial
harmonisation, directed to the particular issues with which it deals.'" See id. at
173-74 (quoting Sidhu, 1 All E.R., at 204). The English court further elaborated
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B. Justice Stevens' Dissent 62
In a purposeful, succinct dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens
modestly asked for consistency in the application of the doctrine
of preemption as applied to treaties when compared to the way it
is applied to other federal laws. Justice Stevens wanted to know
why the Court does not attempt to infer meaning and preempt
existing state law when there is a gap, ambiguity, or silence in
other areas of federal legislation, such as an Act of Congress.
When dealing with a treaty, however, a court, as the Supreme
Court did in Tseng, will preempt state law with little hesitation,
even though it is unclear whether it was the Treaty's intent to do
so. Justice Stevens commented that "[elveryone agrees that the
literal text of the treaty does not preempt claims of personal
injury that do not arise out of an accident... [and] that nothing
in the drafting history requires [such a] result."163 He is right.
This Comment has promoted the idea that treaties should not be
read to preempt state law when the treaty is silent as to what
should happen in a given situation, and particularly when
preemption would deny the plaintiff a remedy.
Although Justice Stevens conceded that the drafters
intended by-and-large for the treaty's provisions to supersede
local state law, nevertheless there are some notable exceptions to
this general rule.164 For example, Article 25 expressly creates an
exception for injury arising out of "willful misconduct."165 Just
that personal injury is a particular issue which the Convention addresses in an
effort to secure its objective of uniformity. See id. at 173. This Comment seeks to
take this reasoning one step further and propose that the Warsaw Convention may
indeed deal exclusively with the particular issues implicated in Article 17. But if
Article 17 is not triggered, personal injury claims not within the ambit of Article 17
should not be preempted by the Convention because the drafters did not intend to
unify the rules in such situations.
162 See Tseng, 525 U.S. at 177.
163 Id. at 181 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164 Justice Stevens believed that Tseng's case should either qualify as a
personal injury resulting from an accident or as a result of the willful misconduct of
El Al's agents. Stevens was constrained, however, as was the Court, by a stipulation
of the parties to consider the case as one that belonged in neither of those
categories, but rather as a scenario which lay in the silent abyss of the treaty. See
id. at 178-79 ("I believe ... that petitioner's alleged misconduct was either an
accident.., or involved willfulness .... Be that is [sic] it may, the parties have
insisted that we decide the case on the assumption that it belongs in the sliver
about which the treaty is silent.").
16 Id. at 178 (quoting Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 25(1), 49 Stat. at
3020, 137 L.N.T.S. at 27).
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as the interest for uniformity is discarded when it comes to
injury that arises out of the willful misconduct of the defendant
as per the will of the drafters, so too "the interest in uniformity
would not be significantly impaired if the number of cases not
preempted, like those involving willful misconduct, was slightly
enlarged to encompass those relatively rare cases in which the
injury resulted from neither an accident nor a willful wrong." 66
As mentioned above, non-accident personal injury cases should
not be preempted by the Convention. In fact, by not preempting
scenarios in which the Warsaw Convention is silent, not only
would the Court not be compromising the drafters' hope for
uniformity, but the Court would also be upholding their
intentions to apply the treaty as expressed provisions as
expressed in the particular provisions.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court analyzed the Articles of the Warsaw
Convention and voiced its authority for all the federal courts to
hear. The viewpoints of this Comment, however, are at odds
with the Supreme Court's decision. The Court went through the
step by step analysis promoted in this Comment, but failed to
reach a similar conclusion. Awareness of linguistic differences
and appropriate time period considerations are two factors that
were conspicuously absent from the Supreme Court's analysis.
After all, the context that drives thoughts and ideas to be
reduced to writing is often just as important as the words
themselves. This Comment has attempted to show that the
definition of accident, the ramifications of exclusivity, and the
Montreal Protocol No. 4 all directed the court to a safe landing-
affirming the Second Circuit's opinion. This safe landing would
not have led to a flood of cases as speculated, but rather would
have yielded only a boarding pass to state court for a passenger
who had already paid for her ticket. Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court has instead chosen to cancel the flight for
passengers seeking recovery in state court or, as in the Krys
case, chosen to ignore the consequences of continuing the flight
without providing a remedy to a passenger in need of a safe
16 Id. at 180 (explaining that the Convention's purpose would not be
eviscerated, let alone compromised, if non-accidental personal injury cases were
treated as cases preempted by the Convention).
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landing. The Supreme Court has turned a blind eye to
passengers who must surrender their rights in order to take an
international flight.
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